NOTES
ASPEN EXPLORATION CORP. V SHEFFIELD:

THE STATUS OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
IN ALASKA
It is not easy nowadays to remember anything so contrary to all
appearances as that officials are the servants of the public; and the
official must try not to foster the illusion that it is the other way
round.
- Sir Ernest Gowers i
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions, Aspen Exploration
Corp. v. Sheffield 2 and Breck v. Ulmer,3 have significantly expanded
the immunity of state officials from common law tort claims brought
by private parties. First, both cases broaden the definition of official
activities to which some form of immunity applies. Second, Aspen creates a balancing test for determining whether the applicable official
immunity should be absolute or qualified. However, absolute immunity is given a disproportionate weight in this balancing test so that, in
the majority of situations, officials now will be entitled to the protection of absolute immunity where previously only qualified immunity
was available.
This note and the Aspen and Breck decisions refer to the immunity of state officials from personal liability for common law torts committed while performing the duties of their respective offices. Most
American jurisdictions grant such immunity only when the tortious
activity is "discretionary" (as opposed to "ministerial") 4 and within
the "scope of [the official's] authority." 5 When these two conditions
Copyright © 1990 by Alaska Law Review
1. E. GOWERS, PLAIN WORDS: THEIR ABC 26 (1954).
2. 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987).

3. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023 (1988).
4. "Discretionary" acts are those requiring personal deliberation or judgment,

while "ministerial" acts are those which the official performs without any choice of his
own.

5. The "scope of authority" for state officials has no clear definition. See Section
VI for further discussion.

188

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:187

are met, jurisdictions are split on which of two doctrines of official
immunity should be applicable: qualified or absolute immunity.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity the state official cannot be
sued for a common law tort, unless the tortious activity involves mal-

ice, corruption or bad faith. 6 Under the doctrine of absolute immunity, the official cannot be sued for any common law tort, even if it

involves malice, corruption or bad faith. 7 One also may describe qualified immunity as shielding an official from damages, but not from suit,
and absolute
immunity as shielding an official from suit as well as from
8
damages.
As used in this note, the terms "official" and "public official" refer to members of the executive or administrative branches of state and
local government. Members of the legislative and judicial branches
are entitled to different forms and levels of immunity than those discussed in this note. The liability of state officials for constitutional
torts is also beyond the scope of examination. 9 Finally, this note does
not deal with sovereign immunity, which is the immunity of the state
itself from liability for the tortious activities of its officials.
This note will first discuss the history of official immunity doctrines in the United States. The note then argues that qualified immunity is preferable to absolute immunity. After summarizing the Aspen
and Breck decisions, the note asserts that these decisions have significantly expanded the scope of official immunity in Alaska, and that the
Aspen balancing test is an undesirable system of official immunity.
II.

THE HISTORY OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Traditionally, the common law did not afford any immunity to
state officials for tortious activities committed while in office. 10 However, in the landmark case of Spalding v. Vilas, the United States
6. Aspen, 739 P.2d at 158.
7. Id.
8. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Oficials and Employees 360 (1984).
9. Constitutional torts occur when a state official wrongfully deprives a citizen of
his or her civil rights. Such torts are often referred to as "section 1983 claims" after
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981), which created the liability of public officials for the denial of
any person's constitutional rights. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690-91 (1978). Qualified immunity is generally applicable to constitutional torts.
See, e.g., State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 316 (Alaska 1984). For further discussion of
section 1983 claims in Alaska as they apply to suits against the state itself and against
individuals in their official capacities, see Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588, 593 (Alaska
1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3184 (1989).
10. 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.8 (2d ed.
1986).
11. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).

1990]

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Supreme Court, for the first time, granted absolute immunity to federal officials acting within the scope of their authority. The Court initially limited the new doctrine of absolute immunity to high-ranking
officials, but federal courts gradually expanded the doctrine to apply to
lower-level officials and bureaucrats as well. 12

The federal courts cited three primary reasons for establishing the

unprecedented absolute immunity doctrine. 13 First, the courts de-

cided that the threat of personal liability to public officials would hamper the effective administration of the government by deterring
officials from boldly and fearlessly performing their duties. 14 Second,
the threat of personal liability would deter the best available individu-

als from entering public service. 15 Third, liability would further prevent public officials from effectively performing their duties because

their time would be taken up with the defense of numerous lawsuits.16
A minority of states have followed the lead of the federal courts

in affording absolute immunity to state officials. 17 The vast majority
of states, however, have refused to adopt the reasoning of the federal

courts. These states afford their officials only qualified immunity. 18 In
Alaska prior to Aspen, the supreme court recognized official immunity
in several decisions, provided that the official action was discretionary

and within the scope of authority.19 However, the court never clearly
20
defined the extent, absolute or qualified, of the immunity afforded.

12. See Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Laughlin v. Garnett, 138 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944); Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941); Lang v. Wood,
92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 686 (1937); Parravicino v. United
States ex rel. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934). See generally Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 303, 335-38 (1959) (discussing the
evolution of the federal immunity doctrine).
13. The federal courts also justified absolute immunity by asserting that it would
be unjust to hold personally liable an officer who is required by the legal obligations of
his position to exercise discretion, and that the ballot box is a more appropriate
method of dealing with corrupt officials. See Aspen, 739 P.2d at 157 n. 15, and cases
cited therein.
14. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571
(1959).
15. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975). See also Gray, supra note 12,
at 339.
16. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
17. See generally Gray, supra note 12, at 342-47 (surveying the views on absolute
immunity).
18. See F. HARPER, F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, supra note 10, § 29.10, for lists of
states adopting absolute and qualified immunity and for decisions from each state.
19. See, e.g., Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, 691 P.2d 281, 283-84
(Alaska 1984); State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 1973); Bridges v. Alaska
Housing Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962).
20. See Aspen, 739 P.2d at 153-54.
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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS PREFERABLE TO ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY

The policy reasons advanced in support of absolute immunity, as
outlined in Section II above, appear sensible at first glance. Public
officials faced with the prospect of personal liability and possible bankruptcy for their mistakes would logically be at least somewhat deterred from vigorously performing their duties. Similarly, it is
reasonable to expect that otherwise willing and able candidates would
decide not to enter public service where they may be held liable for
their official actions. However, these arguments are mere assertions
without any empirical support. 2 1 There is no factual evidence of a
chilling effect or lack of capable public servants in the period prior to
Spalding, when official immunity did not exist, nor were officials subjected to an inordinate number of personal liability lawsuits. 22 Further, these problems are not evident in the states which have adopted
qualified immunity.
In fact, absolute immunity is found in virtually no other jurisdiction in the free world,2 3 and yet there are no reports of the alleged dire
24
consequences of official immunity that is less than absolute.
This is not to say that there is no merit in protecting state officials
from common law tort claims. The complete freedom of private parties to sue officials for perceived wrongs might well open the door to
frivolous claims, or claims brought for the sole purpose of damaging
21. The lack of substance to these justifications has been expressed in more colorful language. Gray, supra note 12, at 339 ("Such arguments offer a wry blend of fairy
tale and horror story."); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 590 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Such arguments are "gossamer web[s] selfspun without a scintilla of support
to which one can point.").

22. For example, even the Aspen court admits that the dangers of multitudinous
lawsuits against governors are probably exaggerated:
[I]t would seem that the very nature of this high office would make the gov-

ernor a ready target for numerous lawsuits. History, however, does not bear
out this assumption. The present appeal is the first case to reach this court
in which a governor has been sued for personal tort liability. Neither party
points to any trend, past or present, indicating that governors in general

have been the target of a disproportionate number of lawsuits and our own
research fails to denote any such phenomena. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that governors in jurisdictions that follow a

rule of qualified immunity are any more subject to suit than their counterparts in states where absolute immunity is the rule.
739 P.2d at 161.
23. Gray, supra note 12, at 339.
24. Obviously, there are numerous differences between the legal systems of other

free world countries and the United States. These differences range from fundamental
distinctions between civil and common law traditions to differences in the populace's

propensity to litigate claims. However, the near complete lack of governmental chilling in other nations, particularly Great Britain, indicates that the fears of the federal

courts are unfounded. Id. at 339-40.
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the reputation of an official. It is also reasonable and just to shield
state officials from liability for their exercise of discretion within the
scope of their authority, provided that officials do not abuse their powers by exercising their discretion maliciously, corruptly or in bad faith.
Virtually every official exercise of discretion has two or more possible
outcomes. Each outcome is usually supported by a different group of
constituents. Thus, no matter how an official exercises his or her discretion, the decision will be to the advantage of some constituents and
to the disadvantage of others. Therefore, it certainly would be difficult
for an official to make such decisions if the official were concerned
with the possibility of suits from the disadvantaged parties.
Qualified immunity is preferable to absolute immunity because it
protects honest officials who are simply trying to do their jobs from
suits based on their discretionary activities, 25 while it also prevents
officials from using their immunity as a cloak to hide corrupt and malicious activities. 2 6 Qualified immunity also protects the interests of
maliciously injured parties by affording them a remedy against their
malefactor, because, by definition, qualified immunity does not extend
to torts involving malice, corruption or bad faith.2 7
Officials should be immune from liability for honest mistakes because holding them liable for such mistakes is likely to result in chilling and deterrence from public service - a result with consequences
more harmful than honest mistakes themselves. 28 However, officials
should not be immune from liability for malicious actions because the
consequences of malicious actions would be worse than the minor intrusions of having courts occasionally inquiring into such actions.2 9
These conclusions follow directly from the fact that the dangers arising from the abuse of political power are greatest when corruption and
malice are involved. 30 Therefore, qualified immunity is a better solution than absolute immunity.

IV.

ASPEN EXPLORATION CORP. V SHEFFIELD

Aspen Exploration Corporation brought four claims of wrongful
interference and one claim of defamation against former Alaska Governor Bill Sheffield. The complaint alleged that Sheffield had "knowingly, intentionally and maliciously" ordered the Commissioner of the
Department of Natural Resources to reject Aspen's application for offshore prospecting permits, and that the Governor had defamed
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 43 Del. Ch. 485, 496, 238 A.2d 331, 338 (1968).
Id.
Aspen, 739 P.2d at 158.
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 10, § 29.10.
Id.
Id.
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Aspen's business reputation. 31 The trial court dismissed the complaint
and found that the Governor's actions were within the scope of his
authority and were discretionary in nature. The trial court held that
the Governor was therefore immune from a "personal suit seeking per'32
sonal compensation.
After extensively reviewing the doctrines of qualified and absolute
immunity, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a new approach to official immunity by creating a two-step analysis. First, a court must determine whether the alleged tortious actions are discretionary in
nature and within the scope of the official's authority. 33 If the tortious
actions fail to meet either of these conditions, then no immunity is
afforded to the official. Second, a court must determine whether the
immunity afforded is absolute or qualified. 34 This determination must
be made by balancing the "public's interest in efficient, unflinching
leadership [against] the interests of maliciously injured parties. ' 35 The
Aspen court enumerated the following factors to be considered in the
new balancing test:
(1) The nature and importance of the function that the officer performed to the administration of government (i.e., the importance to
the public that this function be performed; that it be performed correctly; that it be performed according to the best judgment of the
officer unimpaired by extraneous matters);
(2) The likelihood that the officer will be subjected to frequent accusations of wrongful motives and how easily the officer can defend
against these allegations; and
(3) The availability to the injured party of other remedies or other
forms of relief (i.e., whether the injured party can obtain some other
kind of judicial review of the correctness or validity of the officer's
action).36

The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the Governor's actions were within his scope of authority. The supreme court
rejected Aspen's argument that any intentional and malicious actions
are necessarily outside the scope of authority because official powers
were not intended to be used other than for the public good. 37 The
court stated that "as long as Governor Sheffield's actions were, on
their face, within the scope of his authority, the fact that Aspen alleges
that they were performed with unlawful intent is irrelevant to this part
of our analysis."' 38 The court found that the Governor's actions in
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Aspen, 739 P.2d at 151.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 154.
Id.
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ordering the rejection of Aspen's application, and in speaking out publicly on the impact of Aspen's application, were "clearly" within the
scope of the Governor's authority as defined in the Alaska
39
Constitution.
The supreme court also agreed with the trial court that the Governor's actions were discretionary. For purposes of official immunity,
the supreme court adopted the State v. Haley4° definition of discretionary and ministerial acts.4 1 Haley defined discretionary acts as
those requiring "'personal deliberation, decision and judgment,' "42
and defined ministerial acts as those amounting" 'only to obedience of
orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left with no
choice of his own.' "43 The Aspen court found that
[i]n ordering the rejection of Aspen's permit applications, Sheffield
was engaged in an exercise of "supervisory authority" over his subordinates. When and whether to supervise subordinates, and how
much supervision is required, are fundamental policy determinations that must be made by any governor. The exercise of such authority, by its very nature, involves personal deliberation
and
44
judgment. It is, therefore, discretionary in nature.
The court also held that the Governor's allegedly defamatory statements were discretionary acts because Aspen failed to deal adequately
45
with the issue in its brief.
Because the court found that Governor Sheffield's actions were
discretionary and within the scope of his authority, the first step of the
analysis was satisfied. The court then turned to the new balancing test
to determine the extent of the Governor's immunity. The court determined that the first factor, the importance of the function to the administration of government, tilted the balance toward absolute
immunity with respect to the order to deny Aspen's application.
However, with respect to the Governor's public statements, the first
factor tilted the balance toward qualified immunity. The court
reasoned:
It is undeniably of great importance that the governor engage in the
supervision of his subordinates....

39. Id. at 154-55. The supreme court referred to the Governor's authority as supervisor of all state executive departments, ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 24, and as
holder of all executive powers, ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 1.
40. 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984) (discussing immunity in section 1983 claims).
41. Aspen, 739 P.2d at 155.

42. Haley, 687 P.2d at 316 (quoting W.
TORTS
43.
44.
45.

§ 132 (4th ed. 1971)).
Id.
739 P.2d at 156.
Id.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
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[However,] the importance to the public in allowing the governor carte blanche to intentionally defame a person or business cannot ...be said to rise to the same level of importance as the exercise
of supervisory authority over46 the development and exploitation of
the state's natural resources.

With respect to the order to deny Aspen's application, the court
determined that the second balancing factor, the likelihood of frequent
accusations of wrongful motives and the ease of their defense, also
weighed on the side of absolute immunity. Yet, with respect to the
Governor's public statements, the court again reached the opposite
conclusion and found that the second factor weighed on the side of
qualified immunity. Although the court found that the likelihood of
frequent inquiries into the Governor's motives was low for either
claim, 47 the court felt that the complexity of the wrongful interference
claims would necessitate a lengthy trial, including the testimony of the
Governor and several other officials. 48 Further, such a trial would require the "court and jury ...

to review what were essentially policy

determinations for the executive branch. ' 49 On the other hand, the
issues involved in the alleged defamatory statements were simple and
would therefore not require a complex and lengthy trial. 50 Thus, the
second balancing factor turned on the ease of defending against the
tort claim.
The court held that the final balancing factor, the availability of
alternative remedies, weighed toward absolute immunity as to the denial of Aspen's application, but tipped toward qualified immunity regarding the alleged defamatory remarks. The denial of prospecting
rights was a "final administrative order" entitling Aspen to appeal to
the superior court, a means of relief which Aspen had already used. 5 1
However, no alternative means of relief were presented to Aspen to
redress its injury from defamation.
Thus, regarding the claims of wrongful interference, the supreme
court upheld the trial court and granted absolute immunity to Governor Sheffield. As to the defamation claim, the supreme court reversed
and remanded for a trial using a qualified immunity standard.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 160.
See supra note 22.
Aspen, 739 P.2d at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161-62.
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V.

BRECK V ULMER

In Breck,52 the Alaska Supreme Court decided an issue that it
had expressly left open in Aspen: the extent of official immunity when
the complaint alleges a violation of a statutory provision.5 3 The assembly of the City and Borough of Juneau ("CBJ") awarded a contract for the "design-build" construction of a public parking garage to
Kiewit Construction Company without first engaging in a competitive
bidding process.5 4 Breck brought suit against the assembly members,
asserting that their decision violated section 9.14 of the CBJ Charter,55
and seeking to hold them personally liable for payments made under
the allegedly illegal contract.5 6 Breck further contended that CBJ
Charter section 9.13(b) 57 required the assembly members to repay to
the municipality the sum already expended under the contract plus
any future payments.58 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the assembly members, concluding that "the assembly members 'were
clearly acting within the sphere of legislative activity and are, therefore, absolutely immune from personal liability for their legislative
acts.' "59 The trial court further held that CBJ Charter section 9.13(b)
60
did not apply to the assembly members.
The supreme court first distinguished between "legislative" and
"administrative" acts of public officials. The court relied on State v.
52. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023
(1988).
53. The Aspen court stated: "Our opinion is limited solely to situations where a
plaintiff's common law rights are involved. We express no opinion as to situations
where a public official violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights."
739 P.2d at 160 n.23.
54. Breck 745 P.2d at 67 n. 1.
55. City and Borough of Juneau (hereinafter "CBJ") Charter section 9.14
provides:
Competitive Bidding. The assembly by ordinance shall provide for competitive bidding and procedures for competitive bidding. Contracts for public
improvement and, whenever practicable, other purchase of supplies, materials, equipment, and services, except professional services and services of officers and employees of the municipality, shall be by competitive bid and
awarded to the lowest qualified bidder.
Id. at 68 n.4.
56. Id. at 68.
57. CBJ Charter section 9.13(b) provides:
Every payment made in violation of the provisions of this Charter shall be
illegal. All officers and employees of the municipality who knowingly authorize or make such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the
municipality for the full amount so paid.
Id. at 68-69.
58. Id. at 69.
59. Id. (quoting unpublished trial court opinion).
60. Id. at 69.
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Haley6' for the rule that officials are entitled to absolute immunity for

their legislative acts. 62 The court stated that the characterization of an
official act as legislative depended not on the actor's position within
the government, but on the nature of the act, and "'[flor that reason,
not all governmental acts by a local legislator, are necessarily legislative in nature.' "63 The court held that "the acts of local legislators are
legislative only if their acts have general applicability or involve policy
making, as opposed to being a specific application of a particular policy." 64 The CBJ assembly members' award of the contract was a specific application of general policy and not a legislative act. Therefore,
the assembly members were not entitled to the absolute immunity gen6
erally afforded to legislative acts. The court then turned to the question left open in Aspen: the
extent of immunity for the assembly members' administrative act allegedly in violation of a statute. For such acts, the court adopted a
66
two-part test originally established in the federal courts:
First, the court must look to currently applicable law and determine
whether that law was clearly established at the time the action in
question occurred. If the law was not clearly established, the public
official will be immune. Second, if the law was clearly established at
the time the action occurred, the public official must show that, because of extraordinary circumstances, "he neither knew nor should
have known of the relevant legal standard." 67
The court noted that, as in Aspen, the official acts must also be discretionary and within the scope of authority. When these conditions and
the above two-part test are satisfied, then the public official will be
entitled to qualified immunity for violating a statutory or constitu68
tional provision.
The supreme court held that the award of the parking garage contract was within the scope of the assembly members' authority. 69 As in
Aspen, the court reached this result even though the officials allegedly
knew that their actions were unlawful. 70 Similarly, the assembly
61. 687 P.2d 305, 319 (Alaska 1984).
62. Breck, 745 P.2d at 70.
63. Id. at 70-71 (quoting Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 57980 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)).
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 71-72.
'67. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 207 (N.D. Ill.
1986)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (citation omitted)).
68. Breck, 745 P.2d at 72.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id. at 72.
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members acted within the scope of their authority even if their interpretation of the powers granted them by the relevant statute was erro71
neously broad.
Breck argued that the actions of the assembly members were ministerial because the statute gave them no choice but to award the contract to the lowest qualified bidder.72 However, the court essentially
ignored this argument, stating that "[i]t is obvious to us that the assembly members had to deliberate and exercise their judgment in determining whether or not to approve the award of the contract, and we
'73
therefore find their actions discretionary.
The court concluded that the competitive bidding procedures did
not constitute clearly established law. 74 At the time of the contract
award, no case law interpreting the provisions of the CBJ Charter, or
similar provisions in the CBJ Code or state code, existed. Further, the
assistant city-borough attorney had advised the assembly members
that the "design-build" contract award was "defensible. ' 75 Because
the court concluded that the first part of the two-part test was satisfied, the court afforded qualified immunity to the assembly members
and affirmed the lower court because Breck's complaint did not allege
76
malice, corruption or bad faith.
The court also held that CBJ Charter section 9.13(b) did not abrogate this qualified immunity, because the Charter evinced no intent
to do so.77 The court felt that the Charter's provision that only of78
ficers who "knowingly" authorize illegal payments will be held liable
was the same as the qualified immunity standard, which imposes liability for malice, corruption or bad faith. Therefore, the intent to abrogate qualified immunity was not present. 79
VI.

ASPEN AND BRECK EXPAND THE ACTIONS TO WHICH
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY APPLIES

The decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court in Aspen and Breck
significantly expand the number of actions for which immunity will be
afforded to state officials. First, these cases adopt a very broad definition of "discretionary" actions. In Aspen, the court could have held
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 73.
(footnote omitted).
at 73-74.
at 73.
at 74.

77. Id.

78. See supra note 57.
79. Breck, 745 P.2d at 74.
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the Governor's denial of Aspen's application to be discretionary because it involved a consideration of environmental and other social
impacts. Instead, however, the court found the action to be discretionary based on a much more tenuous element of discretion: the Governor's determination of "[w]hen and whether to supervise subordinates,
and how much supervision is required ....
-8o Because so many dayto-day official actions incidentally involve the supervision of subordinates, the number of non-discretionary (that is, ministerial) actions is
severely limited by the Aspen court's standard. Further, the court in
Breck stated that it was "obvious" that the award of public contracts
required personal deliberation, 81 even though the statute involved
seemed to require that the municipality award the contract only to the
lowest qualified bidder.82 If the administration of a clear-cut statutory
duty is not ministerial, then it is difficult to imagine an action that
would be ministerial or a situation where immunity would not exist. 83
In addition, the supreme court has also adopted a very broad definition of "scope of authority." Breck implies that officers may form
their own good faith interpretations of the scope of their authority,
and will be protected by official immunity even if their interpretations
are erroneous. 84 Thus, under Aspen and Breck the only situation in
which an act can be outside the scope of authority is where the act is
outside even the officer's broad interpretation of his or her power.
It remains true that the courts will afford official immunity only
where an officer's action is both discretionary and within the scope of
his or her authority. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has reduced these preconditions to mere formalities, thereby creating a situation where virtually all official actions are entitled to at least qualified
immunity.
VII.

THE ASPEN BALANCING TEST IS AN UNDESIRABLE SYSTEM

OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

As stated in Section III, qualified immunity is the best solution to
the conflict between the interests of promoting vigorous government
and protecting the public from corruption. The Alaska Supreme
80. Aspen, 739 P.2d at 156.
81. Breck, 745 P.2d at 73.
82. See CBJ Charter section 9.14 (text quoted supra note 55).
83. The Alaska Supreme Court did find the actions of a state official to be ministerial in State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1973). The case involved the sinking of
a crab vessel after it had been seized by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. Id.
at 1286. The court held that the actions of the state official in towing, securing and
inspecting the vessel were ministerial once the discretionary decision to seize the vessel
had been made. Id. at 1291-92. It is unclear whether these same actions would be
ministerial after Aspen and Breck.
84. Breck, 745 P.2d at 72-73.
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Court, however, has chosen to go beyond qualified immunity to afford
absolute immunity for many actions through the use of the Aspen balancing test. By giving disproportionate weight to absolute immunity
in the balancing test, the court has given corrupt officials a potential
cloak behind which to hide their activities. In addition, the uncertainty introduced by the balancing test means that neither state officials nor private litigants can be sure where they stand.
Balancing tests in general are undesirable, particularly when a
bright-line rule is also feasible, because "the very discretion inherent in
balancing tests makes them unpredictable, malleable, and . . . 'ad
hoc.' "85 Commentators have enumerated several problems associated
with balancing tests. First, the tests produce inconsistent results because no methodology exists for their implementation. 86 Second, as a
direct result of their inconsistency, balancing tests fail to notify future
litigants of their rights.8 7 Third, balancing tests force judges to rely
too heavily on their personal values, instead of on the objective facts of
the case.8 8 Fourth, such tests devalue individual rights "by evaluating
potential infringements with a relatively low level of scrutiny."8 9
In the context of official immunity, the disadvantages of a balancing test approach are particularly pronounced. The inconsistency of
balancing tests undermines the goal of deterring governmental corruption. Even if a specific action has been held by one court to give rise to
qualified immunity, an official may not be deterred from corruptly performing the same action in the future if he or she believes that another
court can decide that the balance leans toward absolute immunity.
The fourth disadvantage of balancing tests mentioned above will further undermine deterrence, because judges will tend to devalue the
plaintiff's right to redress in favor of the societal goal of promoting
vigorous government.
The Aspen balancing test is even more undesirable than other balancing tests, because the Aspen test is heavily weighted toward absolute immunity and away from qualified immunity. The three factors
in the test, as interpreted by the Aspen court, separately and collectively tend to assure an absolute immunity result in most cases. In
analyzing the first factor, the importance of the action to the administration of government, the court again emphasized the incidental supervision of subordinates. 90 Apparently, any action involving the
85. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431, 436 (1985).
86. Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1184

(1988).
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.
Aspen, 739 P.2d at 160.
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supervision of subordinates will not only automatically be discretionary, but will also heavily weight the first balancing test factor toward
absolute immunity.
However, the second factor, the likelihood of frequent suits for
similar official actions and the ease of their defense, is even more damaging to the chance that qualified immunity can and will result. This
factor turns primarily on the complexity of the suit.9 1 Thus, except in
simple fact situations, the court would afford absolute immunity to
avoid the necessity of protecting the injured party with a lengthy trial.
The final factor, the availability of alternative remedies, also
makes absolute immunity very likely. Apparently, if the plaintiff has
any other means of redress then the factor will "weigh ... heavily in
favor of granting absolute immunity .... -92 The problem with this
approach is that it assumes that the only reason for allowing suits
against officials is to compensate the injured party. This approach,
however, does not consider the important goal of deterring public officials from malicious actions.
It is true that in Aspen the supreme court held that the governor's
93
alleged defamatory remarks were not entitled to absolute immunity.
However, this holding does not refute the contention that the balancing test is highly one-sided. A common law tort claim against a state
official will receive qualified immunity only if it: (1) does not involve
supervising subordinates, (2) does not involve some other important
state interest, (3) involves only simple issues, and (4) has no other
means of redress. Very few claims will meet all of these conditions.
Therefore, the adoption of the Aspen balancing test was tantamount to
the adoption of absolute immunity in Alaska. Moreover, the Aspen
doctrine has the disadvantages associated with balancing tests in
general.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

What is the status of official immunity in Alaska after Aspen and
Breck? First, for common law tort claims, these two cases firmly establish that some form of immunity will be available in almost every
case. The requirements that the official action be discretionary and
within the scope of authority are accorded very little weight by the
supreme court in these decisions. Second, Aspen essentially creates
virtually universal absolute immunity, although the Aspen balancing
91. Id. at 161. "lIt is a near certainty that Governor Sheffield would have to
testify, and probably a host of other public officials as well.... [Tihe complexity of
Aspen's wrongful interference claims would undoubtedly require a lengthy trial ......
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test may result in qualified immunity in a very limited number of
situations.
The Aspen court was unable to cite any evidence that established
a lack of vigorous government, or a lack of personnel or a plethora of
suits against public officials in qualified immunity jurisdictions. Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to see why the court decided to allow
the near certainty of absolute immunity. On the other hand, the court
did not adequately consider the best policy reason for qualified immunity: the deterrence of malice, corruption and bad faith by public officials. Thus, although qualified immunity is a preferable system of
official immunity, the court missed the opportunity to adopt it
outright.
For claims resulting from the violation of a statutory or constitutional provision, Breck establishes qualified immunity. However, the
cursory treatment given by the Breck court to the discretionary action
and scope of authority preconditions, and to the requirement that the
law not be clearly established, expands again the availability of the
immunity doctrine.
Thus, both Aspen and Breck increase the protection afforded to
public officials. No similar increase in the effectiveness of government
administration is discernible, yet the increase in immunity is at the
expense of the protection of the rights of injured parties and the deterrence of corruption in government.
William L. Bostleman

